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Abstract
As we move towards constructing narratives regarding the
future outlook of global governance, constitutionalisation
among them, the hope is that whatever shape this world
order takes it will, somehow, forestall or hinder the possibili-
ty of a hegemonic order. This article tries to deconstruct the
notion of hegemony and claims that as it currently stands it
is useless in doing its critical work since every successful nar-
rative will end up being hegemonic because it will employ
the ‘hegemonic technique’ of presenting a particular value
(or value system), a particular viewpoint, as universal or at
least applying to those who do not share it. The only way
for a narrative in this discourse not to be hegemonic would
be for it to be either truly universal and find a perspective
that stems from nowhere and everywhere – a divine per-
spective – or purely descriptive; the first being an impossibil-
ity for fallible beings and the other not worth engaging with
since it has nothing to say about how things should be
structured or decided in a specific situation.
Keywords: hegemony, constitutionalism, constitutionalisa-
tion, international criminal law
1. Introduction
As the old Chinese blessing (or curse) goes, we live in
interesting times, times in which our view of the politi-
cal world and its ordering will be re-arranged. We live
in times when scholars feel the need to take stock,1 draw
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1. J. Crawford and S. Nouwen, Select Proceedings of the European Society
of International Law – International Law 1989-2010: A Performance
Appraisal (2012).
a line and do the summations or offer a break2 from pre-
vious explanations of the world’s political map. The
often-mentioned processes of globalisation, integration,
fragmentation, global governance, etc. seem to have
made our old convenient story, the one found in the
opening chapters of international law textbooks – the
one about an international system dominated by nation-
states – seem passé. We talk about the post-Lotus,3 post-
national global environment, where the Lotus principle
is relegated to the dustbin of history even though it
manages to do the heavy lifting in the International
Court of Justice’s opinions as recently as 2010.4 In short,
what we are talking about is a contest for a change, a
change of paradigms,5 master-narratives,6 world-views
that help us both organise and shape the world around
us,7 the contest for the opening chapters of an interna-
tional law textbook.
The editors of this volume have graciously asked us to
assess one of four proposing narratives that vie for our
attention in relation to specific international regimes,
hence this contribution on the international criminal law
(ICL) regime(s) and constitutionalisation. Before I start
my contribution, I would like to make a small clarifica-
tion. The main thrust of this article is the current dis-
course regarding hegemony. As we move towards con-
structing narratives regarding the future outlook of
global governance, constitutionalisation among them,
the hope is that whatever shape this world order takes it
will, somehow, forestall or hinder the possibility of a
hegemonic order. Moreover, constitutionalisation and
its more normative iteration, constitutionalism, have
been most strongly linked to the possibility of strength-
2. N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: the Pluralist Structure of Postna-
tional Law (2010).
3. The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10 (Sept. 7).
4. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 2010 ICJ, General List No. 141,
22 July 2010.
5. M. Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Rela-
tionship between Constitutionalism in and Beyond the State’, in J.L.
Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism,
International Law and Global Governance (2009).
6. M. de S.O. l’E Lasser, ‘Transforming Deliberations’, in N. Huls, et al.
(eds.), The Legitimacy of Highest Court’s Rulings: Judicial Deliberations
and Beyond (2009).
7. D. Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, in J.L. Dunoff and
J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, Interna-
tional Law and Global Governance (2009).
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ening hegemonic rule8 in a rigid and vertical interna-
tional system. Therefore, if we are to move forward in
this debate a little deconstruction of the current concept
of hegemony is in order. It is my contention that as the
current discourse on hegemony stands (as a descriptive
notion),9 it is useless in doing its critical work since
every successful narrative will end up being hegemonic
because it will employ the ‘hegemonic technique’10 of
presenting a particular value (or value system), a partic-
ular viewpoint, as universal or at least applying to those
who do not share it. The only way for a narrative in this
discourse not to be hegemonic would be for it to be
either truly universal and find a perspective that stems
from nowhere and everywhere – a divine perspective –
or purely descriptive; the first being an impossibility for
fallible beings and the other not worth engaging with
since it has nothing to say about how things should be
structured or decided in a specific situation.
The argument will proceed in the following three parts,
in part two I will give a brief overview of the constitu-
tionalisation features focusing mostly on the ad hoc tri-
bunals since they have had a sufficient number of years
in operation and a sufficient case law to make a useful
analysis. The International Criminal Court (ICC), how-
ever, will not be left too far behind. In part three, I will
attempt to foreground the assumptions and values
under which the constituionalisation of ICL takes place
and will also show the values and assumptions that it
sidesteps arguing that as the current concept of hegemo-
ny stands, ICL is a hegemonic system, imposing a liber-
al value system in the guise of a universal one. I will
then use these insights in part four on the challenge of
hegemony hurled at international criminal law by claim-
ing that the current discourse involving hegemony has
lost its critical bite. My claim is that so long as we leave
the concept of hegemony on the abstract and formal lev-
el that it currently holds of “invoking legal rules and
principles on which [a party’s] projected meanings that
support [a party’s] preference and counteract those of
their opponents” where the “objectives of the [actors] is
to make their partial view of that meaning appear as the
total view, their preferences seem like the universal pref-
erence”11 then it loses its critical bite since any narrative
that ultimately succeeds in displacing the current
hegemonic narrative about the international legal order
will also be hegemonic, just differently so. It will be
hegemonic for exactly the same reasons since it will por-
tray some partial view as the universal, accepted, natu-
8. For a discussion on the possibilities of cementing hegemonic rule in the
international order see more in M. Koskenniemi, Global Legal Pluralism:
Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of Thought, Harvard 2005 talk
given at Harvard available at: <www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Kos-
kenniemi/MKPluralism-Harvard-05d[1].pdf>; M. Koskenniemi, The Pol-
itics of International Law at 219-240 (2011); but also see S. Fish, ‘Bou-
tique Multiculturalism, or Why Liberals are Incapable of Thinking about
Hate Speech’, 23 Critical Inquiry, at 378 (1997); Krisch (2012), supra
n. 2.
9. For the descriptive turn in the current international hegemony talk see
Koskenniemi (2011), supra n. 8 at 219.
10. Ibid. at 221-223.
11. Ibid. at 222 (emphasis in the original).
ral, etc. and will try to order the world accordingly.
Consequently, unless we have a rethink of what hegem-
ony is and what is stands for, i.e. tie it down to a sub-
stantive notion, then we will be stuck in a constant loop
of changing hegemonic narratives and relegate the term
hegemonic to a rhetorical insult hurled at ones oppo-
nents to put them on the defensive in the on-going
debate.
2. The Constitutionalisation of
International Criminal Law
Constitutionalism and constitutionalisation are terms
that are somewhat difficult to pin down. Recently the
editors of the new journal Global Constitutionalism
attempted to categorise and distinguish three sets of
concepts, constitution, constitutionalisation and consti-
tutionalism with mixed success.12 They defined consti-
tutionalisation as
the process by which institutional arrangements in
the non-constitutional global realm have taken on a
constitutional quality. However, constitutionalisation
is frequently documented as occurring in a relatively
spontaneous, little coordinated and even elusive man-
ner. Therefore, the extent and quality of constitu-
tionalisation remain to be established by further
research. Politically, this development brings with it
potential conflict following contested constitutional
norms, principles and procedures. (citation omit-
ted)13
Constitutionalism was defined as attempt to “[grapple]
with the consequences of globalisation as a process that
transgresses and perforates national or state borders,
undermining familiar roots of legitimacy and calling for
new forms of checks and balances as a result.”14 Conse-
quently it results in creating a ‘concept that remains
confusing to some, raises scepticism among many and
inspires constructive debate among others’ that is more
of ‘an ‘academic artefact’ rather than an actual constitu-
tion’.15 Consequently what this contribution will focus
on is the constitutionalisation part of the equation rather
than on the constitutionalism one. It will explore certain
features of the international criminal law regime(s) that
have constitutional character in three topics: (a) the
public law foundations of international criminal law,
(b) budding separation of powers at the ICC and (c) the
rule of law.
12. A. Wiener, et al., ‘Global Constitutionalism: Human rights, Democracy
and the Rule of Law’, 1 Global Constitutionalism 1, at 5 (2012).
13. Ibid., at 6.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., footnote omitted.
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2.1. Kompetenz-Kompetenz
The concept of international criminal law as public law
is simple to grasp. It starts from the Germanic tradition
of public law which
is understood, in keeping with the liberal and demo-
cratic tradition, as a body of law to protect individual
freedom and to allow for political self-determination,
[consequently] any act that has an impact on those
values, whether it is legally binding or not, should be
included if that impact is significant enough to give
rise to meaningful concerns about its legitimacy.16
The notion of public law is closely linked to the notion
of public authority with international public authority
being understood as
any authority exercised on the basis of a competence
instituted by a common international act of public
authorities, mostly states, to further a goal which they
define, and are authorized to define, as a public inter-
est. The ‘publicness’ of an exercise of authority, as
well as its international character, therefore depends
on its legal basis. (footnote omitted, emphasis in origi-
nal)17
To the point, “an exercise of international public
authority requires a public law framework.”18 Conse-
quently, and as specifically related to the ICL regimes,
issues that arise regarding competences such as substan-
tive and procedural jurisdictions, legality and delimita-
tion of powers must be based in public law instruments
not only on the tribunals themselves but of other inter-
national actors as well. The various international crimi-
nal tribunals (ICTs) clearly fall in the category of public
authorities, they can have a significant impact on an
individual’s rights and duties, have the power to pro-
nounce on an individual’s guilt or innocence, on that
individual’s detention or incarceration for a significant
amount of time. As such, under the notion of public
authority it must be established and limited by public
law instruments.
In the Tadić case, one of the first post-Cold War ICL
cases, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugosla-
via (ICTY) was faced with exactly these issues.19 The
issues before the tribunal, at least the ones relevant to
this article, were (a) whether the ICTY as an interna-
tional tribunal can decide on issues of its own jurisdic-
tion without having specific jurisdictional authorisation
to do so under its statute and (b) whether it as an inter-
national tribunal can review the legality of an act of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by which the
16. A. von Bogdandy, ‘Developing the Publicness of Public International
Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities’, in
A. von Bogdandy et al. (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by Inter-
national Institutions (2010), at 13.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., at 16.
19. Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdic-
tion, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber
Decision, 2 October 1995 (hereafter Tadić Defense Motion).
ICTY was established. Using the German doctrine of
kompetenz-kompetenz, the ICTY decided that as a judi-
cial organ it has some inherent powers, one stemming
not from the written text of its statute, but on broader
public law notions. It held that “jurisdiction is not
merely and ambit or sphere, … [but] a legal power …
‘to state the law’ … within its ambit, in an authoritative
and final manner.”20 Furthermore “[t]his is the meaning
it carries in all legal systems”21 and that “the constitu-
tive instrument of an international tribunal can limit
some of its jurisdictional powers, but only to the extent
to which such limitation does not jeopardise its ‘judicial
character’” and that “[s]uch limitation cannot … be pre-
sumed and … cannot be deduced from the concept of
jurisdiction itself.”22 It went on to reason that, given the
nature of the organ that the UNSC established – a tri-
bunal – such an organ would have not only the powers
explicitly stated in the establishing document but those
that are inherent in the nature of the organ itself, some-
thing that cannot be divorced from the concept of such
an organ, in this case a tribunal to decide on the scope of
its competence and the legality of its founding docu-
ment.
This power, known as the principle of ‘Kompetenz-
Kompetenz’ in German or ‘la compétence de la compé-
tence’ in French, is part, and indeed a major part, of
the incidental or inherent jurisdiction of any judicial
or arbitral tribunal, consisting of its ‘jurisdiction to
determine its own jurisdiction.’ It is a necessary com-
ponent in the exercise of the judicial function and
does not need to be expressly provided for in the con-
stitutive documents of those tribunals.23
‘True’ the ICTY also said ‘that this power can be limit-
ed by an express provision’ in the founding document,
so long as it does not constitute the ‘undermining of
the judicial character or the independence of the Tribu-
nal’.24 The authority of international criminal tribunals
thus are determined and limited not only by their
founding documents but also by the very substantive
notions inherent in the concepts of legality, one of the
hallmarks of courts (both domestic and international) in
short, by the basics substantive notions of the concept of
public law, a concept which also includes what a court is
and what it is supposed to do.
The ICTY did not only treat itself as a public authority
but the UNSC as well since one of the challenges
launched at the jurisdiction of the tribunal was the claim
that the UNSC did not have the legal basis to establish
an ICT. It specifically referred to the issue so raised as a
constitutional issue25 noting that the
20. Ibid., para. 10.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., para. 11.
23. Ibid., para. 18.
24. Ibid., para. 19.
25. Ibid., paras. 26-27.
52
ELR June 2013 | No. 1 International Criminal Law and Constitutionalisation
Security Council is thus subjected to certain consti-
tutional limitations, however broad its powers under
the constitution may be. Those powers cannot, in any
case, go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the
Organization at large, not to mention other specific
limitations or those which may derive from the inter-
nal division of power within the Organization. In any
case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter
conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus
(unbound by law).26
The ICC has also had its mini constitutional crisis and it
revolved around the issue of what can be called ‘original
powers’ under the Rome Statute in relation to the pro-
tection of witnesses and the concept of who has the final
say regarding the interpretation of the Rome Statute.
The issue arose in the Lubanga case27 in which the
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) refused to disclose the
identity of a witness despite an order28 to do so by the
Trial Chamber. The Chamber decided that because the
OTP “decline[d] to be ‘checked’ by the Chamber … it
[was] necessary to stay … [the] proceedings as an abuse
of the process.”29 The confrontation between the Trial
Chamber and the OTP proceeded to a boiling point
when the Trial Chamber ordered the release of Mr.
Lubanga30 on the grounds that the ‘Prosecution has
materially breached one of its fundamental obligations,
leading to the conclusion that the fair trial of the
accused is thereby rendered impossible’31 due to the
Chamber’s impossibility to carry out one of its primary
functions under the Rome Statute which is to direct and
control the trial process. The crisis was eventually
defused by the Appeals Chamber, which annulled the
oral decision32 on the grounds that all remedies under
the Rome Statute to compel the Prosecutor to cooperate
were not undertaken and that a stay of proceedings,
which was the reason for the release of Mr. Lubanga,
was not necessary. The Appeals Chamber thus conclu-
ded that there was no need to release Mr. Lubanga and
it did so without settling the issue of ‘original powers’.33
In this case, two important considerations clashed, both
of which were essential for the different departments
established by the Rome Statute. For the Trial Cham-
26. Ibid., para. 28.
27. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Trial Chamber Judgment, 14 March 2012.
28. Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation of
the Time Limit to Disclose the identity of Intermediary 143 or Alterna-
tively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the
VWU, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber Decision, 8 July 2010.
29. Ibid., para. 31.
30. Oral decision of Trial Chamber I of 15 July 2010 to release Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber Decision, 15 July 2010,
ICC-01/04-01/06-T-314-ENG.
31. Ibid., at 7 lines 9-12.
32. Judgment on the appeal of Prosecutor against the oral decision of Trial
Chamber I of 15 July 2010 to release Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, The Pros-
ecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Appeals
Chamber, 8 October 2010.
33. Ibid., paras 23-24.
ber, the issues were seen as revolving around fundamen-
tal principles of the Statute, the competence of the
Court proper to guarantee a fair trial, while the OTP
saw the issue as one of the necessities of protecting wit-
nesses and the willingness of future witnesses to cooper-
ate with it in other cases – a power necessary if the OTP
is to conduct investigations and entice individuals to
come forward as witnesses. The language chosen to dis-
pel these differences was one of public law, the language
of jurisdictional competences, of limitations and proper
functions of different organs as well as substantive con-
cepts of the proper nature of a judicial function – the
guaranteeing of a fair trial.
2.2. Separation of Powers in the Rome Statute
A continuation of this theme is the budding separation
of powers amongst the institutions of the ICC. Since the
ICC is a permanent Court with a given structure of
organisation, the shape of arrangements that are cur-
rently in place will likely change in the future. Never-
theless, Scholars have criticised the institutional
arrangements brought about the Rome Statute, includ-
ing the over-independent nature of the ICC
Prosecutor,34 while others have addressed the nascent
emergence of a tri-pillar system of governance.35 But
why is the separation of powers important in the context
of the ICC, and what does it entail?
The separation of powers is a constitutional doctrine on
which virtually all contemporary constitutional states
rest. It is a doctrine that is as old as the idea of constitu-
tions and its purpose, in its original design, was to pro-
vide an institutional answer to 18th century absolute
monarchs by separating the concentration of power ves-
ted in one individual or institution.36 The idea was that
by creating an arrangement by which different organs
would be invested with different functions – legislative,
executive and judicial – while at the same time being
involved in the workings of the other organs so as to put
checks on the possible aggrandisement of power by one
of them (hence the system of separation of powers with
checks and balances) the chances of miss-use of power
would be avoided.37 Different countries have developed
different meshes of this general idea, varying from a
strict separation of powers to more cooperative arrange-
ments with more or less checks and balances.
Certainly a rough analogy can be made of the ICC as a
nascent separation of power system. The Rome Stat-
ute38 does have a tri-part structure: with the Assembly
of State Parties having the role of the legislator, being
34. S. Rosenne, ‘Poor Drafting and Imperfect Organization: Flaws to Over-
come in the Rome Statute’, 41 Virgina Journal of International Law, at
164 (2000); L.A. Casey, ‘The Case Against the International Criminal
Court’, 25 Fordham International Law Journal, at 840 (2001).
35. R. Haveman et al., Supranational Criminal Law: A System Sui Generis
(2003); D. Raab and H. Bevers, ‘The International Criminal Court and
the Separation of Powers’, 3 International Organizations Law Review,
at 93 (2006).
36. Raab and Bevers (2006), supra n. 35 at 93-96.
37. Ibid.
38. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations, Trea-
ty Series, vol. 2187, p. 3.
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the only one with the power to amend the Statute; the
executive resting in the hands of the Prosecutor and to
some extent the Registry; and the judicial function
invested in the Court proper and composed of the Presi-
dency, the Appeals Chamber, Trial and Pre-Trial
Chambers. To some extent parallels can be drawn
between the position of these various branches within
the ICC with their counterparts in different constitu-
tional systems, if we take into account that the ICC is a
limited criminal justice system. Consequently, a proper
comparison might just be the position of different
organs as they would be in relation to their comparative
criminal justice opposites in domestic systems.39 Raab
and Bevers, for instance, compare the roles of the OTP,
the Court proper and the Assembly of States parties
with the analogues institutions and procedures in Eng-
land & Wales and the Netherlands in relation to three
specific areas: prosecutorial discretion, sentencing and
victims’ compensation.40 They concluded that, even
though there are some admirable safeguards through a
separation of powers in the Rome Statute (mostly rela-
ted to curbing prosecutorial discretion regarding the
bringing forth of charges and issuing arrest warrants),
the overall structure is somewhat lacking, mostly in the
area of the Assembly of State Parties, which does not
use the full potential given to it under the Rome Statute
to instigate subsidiary organs of oversight over the
Court proper and the OTP.41
The point of this section is not to establish whether
there is or not a separation of powers mechanism at the
ICC. It is rather to show the inescapability of thinking
in terms of public authority that is not enmeshed in
some sort of an oversight structure and that the most
‘natural’ structure of comparison being the separation of
powers concept. One can make the case that thinking in
terms of separation of powers for international organisa-
tions simply makes little sense since the whole idea of
having a separation of powers in a state was to safeguard
the existence of a democratic system of governance with
rights and individual autonomy as its ultimate aim.
Since those are not the aims shared by the international
system – the system, some would say, is designed for the
peaceful co-existence of states and as such is state cen-
tric – any separation of powers necessity simply goes out
the window. Yet the separation of powers is a recurring
theme for the simple fact that international law (interna-
tional criminal law as well), is public law and as such has
an effect on individuals and their rights and autonomy
and consequently any institution designed around it or
for it needs to incorporate some safeguards familiar to
domestic constitutional law. The Rome Statute in its
current form certainly does not comply with that ideal,
but there are mechanisms in it that if used properly
might bring us closer to that ideal.
39. Raab and Bevers (2006), supra n. 35.
40. Ibid., at. 93.
41. Ibid., at. 131-135.
2.3. The Rule of Law, Stare Decisis and Rules of
Import
The rule of law is another component concept of public
law and public authority since an important aim of pub-
lic law is to limit the powers exercised by public author-
ities, i.e. entities that have an effective on individual
freedom and autonomy. Therefore, the concept of the
rule of law or Rechtsstaat and public law are inseparable.
The rule of law concept has historically had three inter-
related but distinct ‘clusters of meaning’42; (a) govern-
ment limited by law, (b) formal legality and (c) rule of
law and not of men,43 all notions indispensible to the
public law concept. Due to the terse nature of the stat-
utes of the ad hoc tribunals, they were faced with a
daunting problem: how to build a judicial system that
will be based on the rule of law. The only guidance they
had was that their rulings were to be based on crimes
that had become part of customary international law
before the onset of the conflicts to which their mandate
relate.44
For the tribunals, what the rule of law was most linked
to was achieving predictability and consistency of its
rulings. The ICL tribunals have a distinct advantage
over other international tribunals in this regard given
the structure of the systems themselves, i.e. they are all
organised in a hierarchical structure with trial chambers
and an appeals chamber as a final instance. This hier-
archical structure has allowed for a specific feature in
international law to develop – stare decisis.45
Stare decisis is by no means a given in a judicial system;
it is a specific judicial doctrine that has developed in
some but not all common law systems, namely, in the
United States and the United Kingdom. It is a specific
judicial doctrine46 and as such it is created and main-
tained by courts,47 which is the case also for the ad hoc
tribunals. Faced with a mounting case law and a frag-
mented system of trial chambers who could arrive at
conflicting opinions for the same crimes, the ICTY and
consequently the International Criminal Tribunal for
Ruanda (ICTR) adopted the doctrine of stare decisis – a
doctrine designed to achieve consistency and predicta-
bility on a systematic level.
The issue was decided by the Aleksovski Appeals Cham-
ber judgment.48 In this case, the ICTY’s Appeals
Chamber had to consider the issue of whether every
42. B.Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (2004),
at 114.
43. Ibid.
44. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), presented 3 May 1993, UN Doc. No.
S/25704, paras 34-36.
45. See the claim by Dapo Akande regarding stare decisis as a feature of
the ad hoc tribunals, D. Akande, ‘Sources of International Criminal
Law’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Internation-
al Criminal Justice (2009), at 53.
46. R.J. Kozel, ‘Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine’, 67 Washington & Lee
Law Review, at 411 (2010).
47. For a historical development of stare decisis see F.G. Kempin Jr., ‘Prece-
dent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850’, 3 The Ameri-
can Journal of Legal History, at 28 (1959).
48. Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Appeals Chamber Judgment
IT-95-14/1 24 March 2000 (hereafter the Aleksovski appeals chamber).
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decision arrived at by a trial chamber or any other court
for that matter “has no binding force [in international
law] except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case”49 or whether as a matter of practice
highest courts as well as international courts follow its
previous judgments. Using comparison of various dif-
ferent national and international courts, the ICTY’s
Appeals Chamber came to the conclusion “that the
principles which underpin the general trend in both the
common law and civil law systems, whereby the highest
courts, whether as a matter of doctrine or of practice,
will normally follow their previous decisions and will
only depart from them in exceptional circumstances, are
the need for consistency, certainty and predictability”
and that “[t]his trend is also apparent in international
tribunals.” It also concluded that “that need is particu-
larly great in the administration of criminal law, where
the liberty of the individual is implicated.”50 However,
the basic principles of public law were not the only
determinative authorities invoked by the Appeals
Chamber – it also invoked its founding document the
ICTY statute and its structural element of having both
Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chamber, its text and
its purpose arriving at “the conclusion that in the inter-
ests of certainty and predictability, the Appeals Cham-
ber should follow its previous decisions, but should be
free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the inter-
ests of justice.”51
The terseness of the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals pre-
sented them with another problem – how to turn a few
articles giving broad definitions of the crimes at stake
into concrete, workable criminal law definitions. Noth-
ing in the ad hoc statutes or the accompanying docu-
ments, unlike the ICC, gave any indication as to what
would be the mens rea and actus reus requirements of, for
example, the crime of rape, even though rape as such
was specifically mentioned. The path that the ad hoc tri-
bunals took was one of borrowing definitions already
present in other branches of law, more specifically inter-
national human rights law. It is not the subject of this
article to show how the tribunals constructed their own
statutes using authorities outside of their narrow realm,
but to point out the unmistakable dilemma that ICL has
had to face and that is on the one hand its closeness of
purpose and shared identity with international human
rights as the rules of law designed to protect individu-
als52 but on the other hand the need to establish itself as
a separate and distinct branch of law.53 The way it ach-
ieved this ‘threading of the needle’ was to specify rules
under which this import and exchange can take place by
highlighting the similarities and differences between its
49. Art. 59 of the ICJ Statute.
50. Aleksovski Appeals Chamber judgment, para. 97.
51. Ibid., para. 111.
52. D. Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’, 21 Lei-
den Journal of International Law, at 925 (2008).
53. For a good overview of the dilemma that ICL faces see L. Grover, ‘A
Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of
Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 21
European Journal of International Law, at 543 (2010).
neighbouring regimes. For example, while importing
and refining the definition of torture found in interna-
tional human rights law, the ICTY Trial Chamber in
the Kunarac case54 highlighted the key structural differ-
ences between those two bodies of law that “the role and
position of the state is completely different in both
regimes;” that human rights aim to curtail “the abuses
of state over its citizens [and] state sponsored violence,”
where “the state is the ultimate guarantor of the rights
protected.”55 On the other hand “humanitarian law aims
at placing restraint on the conduct of warfare,” where
“the role of the state is, when it comes to accountability,
peripheral” and “[i]ndividual criminal responsibility
does not depend on the participation of the state.”56
Moreover, ‘international criminal law [...] is a penal law
regime”‘ which “‘sets one party, the prosecutor, against
another, the defendant” while in human rights law “the
respondent is the state.”57 Consequently, any import of
norms from one field of law to the other has to be done
carefully so that “notions developed in the field of
human rights can be transposed in international human-
itarian law only if they take into consideration the spe-
cificities of the latter body of law.”58
These perceived structural differences in the two bodies
of law later shape the debate regarding the importation
of a definition of a certain crime, like the crime of tor-
ture. Again in the Kunarac case, the ICTY Trial Cham-
ber found that UN Torture Convention59 is only an
‘interpretative aid’ and because its definition of torture
“was meant to apply at an inter-state level”60 and not as
part of a penal law regime. Consequently, a court “must
identify those elements of the definition of torture
under human rights law which are extraneous to inter-
national criminal law as well as those which are present
in the latter body of law but possibly absent from the
human rights regime,”61 namely, “those which are
addressed to states and their agents and those […]
which are addressed to individuals.”62 By employing
this reasoning, the ad hoc tribunals did something very
specific to any constitutional system – it defined the
terms of the relationship that it would have with other
legal systems and that relationship is one of engagement
and adaptation with other regimes. It is the hallmark of
pluralism, a substantive feature of the constitutionalisa-
tion narrative that has been highlighted by the majority
54. Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic,
IT-96-23-T& T-96-23/1-T Trial Chamber Judgment, 22 February 2001
(hereafter the Kunarac Trial Chamber judgment).
55. Ibid., para. 470.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., para. 471.
59. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty
Series, vol. 1465, p. 85.
60. Kunarac Trial Chamber judgement, para. 482.
61. Ibid., para. 488.
62. Ibid., para. 489.
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of scholars writing on this topic.63 One can see the
modalities of this approach if one compares the way the
ad hocs have engaged with ‘foreign’ law with the way in
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has han-
dled judgments and law coming from other courts.
While the ICJ has been dismissive of the rulings of the
ICTY on international armed conflict and state respon-
sibility, the ad hoc tribunals have been quite engaging
with, what from a regime perspective can be called, for-
eign law, arguing the merits of substantive notions rath-
er than dismissing them on a procedural basis.64
3. Liberalism in the Foreground
As the international relations scholar Bass has success-
fully argued, the progenitor of contemporary criminal
trials, the Nuremberg tribunal, was borne out of a fierce
debate within the Roosevelt administration over the best
way to handle the post-war transition of Germany.65
One of the options on the table was the infamous Mor-
genthau plan of turning Germany into a ‘pastoral state’
with little to no heavy industry and sustaining itself on
agriculture. Previous talk also included the summary
execution of between 50,000 and 100,000 top German
officers and Nazi officials. The Morgenthau plan was
fiercely opposed by the then Secretary of War, Stimson,
who proposed and finally convinced Roosevelt’s succes-
sor, Truman, to pursue a far more liberal approach to
dealing with the Nazi atrocities of World War II, a set of
criminal trials for the highest ranking Nazi officials.
Stimson’s success is that much greater given the spec-
tacular failure of the post World War I trials of German
and Turkish officers.66
This approach was decidedly liberal in its inception; it
was premised on the conviction that the proper response
to the war’s atrocities was not ‘naked’, ‘baseless’ retri-
bution but retribution tempered by law and justice. The
individuals at trial would not be subjected to retribution
just because they happened to lose the war but because
they violated international law and treaty commitments.
It is an approach that is firmly rutted in the belief of
individual freedom and individual responsibility for
63. For instance these authors in some form or another talk about a pluralist
constitutional order Jeffrey L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman, ‘A Functional
Approach to International Constitutionalization’, in J.L. Dunoff and J.P.
Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International
Law and Global Governance (2009); Jan Klabbers et al., The Constitu-
tionalization of International Law (2009); Kumm (2009), supra n. 5;
Wiener (2012), supra n. 12.
64. Compare the Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Appeals Chamber judgment,
IT-94-1-A, July 15, 1999 (hereafter Tadić Appeals Chamber judgment)
with Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Mon-
tenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43 in relation to state
responsibility and imputability, but also see Kumm (2009), supra n. 5,
regarding the change of paradigm towards cosmopolitan constitutional-
ism and the substantive engagement that it requires.
65. G. Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: the Politics of War
Crimes Tribunals: with a New Afterword by the Author (2000).
66. For a more detailed account of the historical events that lead to the cre-
ation of the Nuremberg tribunals see ibid.
one’s actions, in the belief of rationality as a guide for
human actions – even illegal ones – quite contrary to the
notion of collective responsibility and the concomitant
taint of nations, which is more in line with a Romantic
view of the world.67 This liberal world view plays a dou-
ble role in international criminal law, both on the side of
the subjects of protection – dignity, individual autono-
my, bodily integrity and human rights in general – as
well as on the side of those responsible for it presuppo-
ses rational individuals acting with reasons amicable to
liberal rationality subjected to normal criminal law con-
straints. As such, the approach taken in dealing with
mass atrocities of this kind is to put the people involved
through a thoroughly liberal criminal procedure.68
It is in this context worthwhile to explore the values that
the ICL regimes protect. In a seminal piece on the sub-
ject, Identity Crisis,69 Darryl Robinson charts the prob-
lems that the international criminal tribunals were and
still are facing while interpreting their respective stat-
utes. The basic problem is simple; on the one hand,
international criminal tribunals are committed to the
liberal ideal of procedural criminal justice epitomised in
the principles of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime with-
out law) and in dubio pro reo (when in doubt for the
accused), while on the other hand, stands their commit-
ment to human rights liberalism espousing an expansive
protection of victims of atrocities, which has led to an
expansionary interpretation of the crimes defined in the
statutes. In a sense, this is a clash of liberalisms; on the
one hand, the commitments to a liberal criminal justice
system with legality and predictability at its centre and
on the other hand, the ever growing need to extend the
protection of individuals in times of conflict70 bringing
in fears of substantive (rather than procedural) justice.71
Furthermore, it is not just any human rights that are
protected, but a very specific liberal take on rights that
is in question. Certainly, political rights are mainly in
the focus for what ICL protects is the notion of dignity
as related to bodily integrity, right to life and individual
autonomy. The case law of the tribunals is littered with
references to such ideals. For instance, in the Furundžija
67. For a more in-depth discussion on individual versus collective responsi-
bility of nations, see G.P. Fletcher, Romantics at War: Glory and Guilt
in the Age of Terrorism (2002); K. Jaspers and E. Basch, The Question
of German Guilt (1947).
68. On the challenges that international criminal law is facing regarding its
liberal ruttes in securing legality and consistency in interpretation see
Grover (2010), supra n. 53. On the problems that a liberal framework
of issues such as command authority and scientific rationality see T. Kel-
sall, Culture Under Cross-examination: International Justice and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (2009).
69. Robinson (2008), supra n. 52.
70. Especially see ibid. at 928 and specifically footnote 14 which goes to
say: ‘A.M. Danner and J.S. Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility and the Development of Interna-
tional Criminal Law’, 93 California Law Review 75, at 81-89 (2005),
have suggested that a human rights approach to interpretation, favour-
ing large and liberal constructions, is inapposite to ICL. This [Robin-
son’s] article agrees with that observation and supplements it by point-
ing out other modes– including substantive, structural, and ideological
assumptions – by which human rights liberalism can undermine criminal
law liberalism.’
71. Grover (2010), supra n. 53, at 550-563.
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Trial Chamber judgment, the Chamber emphasised that
“[t]he essence of the whole corpus of international
humanitarian law as well as human rights law lies in the
protection of the human dignity of every person” and
that this “principle of respect for human dignity is the
basic underpinning and indeed the very raison d’être of
international humanitarian law and human rights law”
which has “become of such paramount importance as to
permeate the whole body of international law.”72 This
permeation goes centrally to the purpose of internation-
al law itself, which due to the “absolute nature of most
obligations imposed by rules of international humanitar-
ian law reflects the progressive trend towards the so-
called ‘humanisation’ of international legal obliga-
tions.”73
In its liberal origins, ICL has left itself unable or unwill-
ing to offer protection to human beings who suffer not
as a direct consequence of war, but of the very liberal
distinction of public and private actions since for some-
thing to fall under the rubric of an international crime it
has to have been committed by individuals who are
somehow connected to an organisation, a state or a gov-
ernment-like group that exercises state like authority.
Again it is individuals and not groups that are the per-
petrators; it is just that they have to be connected to a
government like entity. Otherwise it would not be possi-
ble, for instance in the crime of genocide, to distinguish
between a deranged individual that wants to kill all
members of the Jedi religion in Australia (a lone geno-
cider as it were) that is caught waiting in the shadows of
an alley for her first victim and a government or rebel
group that has a plan or policy to exterminate all mem-
bers of the Jedi religion in Australia;74 one is a mad
serial killer, and the other is a genocide waiting to hap-
pen.75
But it is not only the fact that ICL has a particular inter-
nal problem with distinguishing between certain serial
killers and people who commit genocide, but it has a
particular blind spot when it comes to actions that hap-
pen through market forces.76 ICL does not have a
response to events where government distributed farm
subsidies for the production of ethanol from corn causes
an increase of poverty and food insecurity to the point of
72. Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
10 December 1998, para. 183 (hereafter the Furundžija Trial Chamber
judgment).
73. Prosecutor v Zoran  Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, Vlatko Kupreškić,
Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic, Vladimir Cantic, Trical Chamber Judg-
ment, IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, para. 518 (hereafter Kupreškić Tri-
al Chamber Judgment).
74. For the census problems that followers of the Jedi movement have cre-
ated in the Australian census go to?
<www.theage.com.au/national/census-wont-count-jedis-or-pastaferi-
ans-20110727-1i0m9.html> (last visited 4 September 2012).
75. For a discussion on the need to have the criteria for plan or policy as
part of the elements of the crime of Genocide see W.A. Schabas, ‘State
Policy as an Element of International Crimes’, 98 The Journal of Crimi-
nal Law and Criminology, at 953 (2008).
76. T. Barkawi, ‘A Comment on Peters and Nagy: The State in Critical Per-
spective’, in J. Crawford and S. Nouwen (eds.), Select Proceedings of
the European Society of International Law (2012), Arguing the current
international law blind spot regarding its liberal and free market
assumptions.
raising the instances of starvation due to rising food
prices.77 A debasing of dignity, of real mental and physi-
cal suffering due to starvation is not within the scope of
ICL simply because the mechanism by which the rise in
food prices and increase in food insecurity is due to the
impersonal market mechanism. In a liberal framework
of limited government and protected individual autono-
my, the high volume of individual choices to sell
foodstuffs for ethanol production and the aggregated
individual choices of buying ethanol for fuel via the
impersonal power of the market cannot be criminal even
though the incentives can be government induced and
the results more lethal and bring about more suffering
than the wars for which some tribunals have been estab-
lished. It is so because the free individual choice and
individual autonomy, even the one that leads to disas-
trous consequences for others through environmental
degradation, is what is to be protected and the only pro-
tection worth considering is protection from direct gov-
ernment or group intrusion and not the invisible hand
of the market.
Furthermore, ICL is but one way in dealing with past
atrocities, the other obvious one being truth and recon-
ciliation commissions, yet it has managed to seize a good
chunk of the resources in dealing with mass atrocities
with limited local success. International criminal trials
have been accused of being too costly,78 that the trials
take too long, that the end result may not be the deter-
mination of truth but a show trial,79 and with limited
involvement of the local communities that have gone
through these traumatic events. As a privileged dis-
course – the discourse of fighting impunity – it siphons
time, money and energy from other ways of transitional
justice mechanism at the same time leaving less space
for victims of atrocities. As such it is a part of the
humanitarian hegemonic discourse80 that draws resour-
ces ‘to the centre from the periphery’ and “is a ‘univer-
sal’ idea of what counts as a problem and what works as
a solution [that] snuffs out all sorts of promising local
political and social initiatives to contest local conditions
in other terms.”81 As a dominant discourse about what
to do in cases of atrocities, it can deny legitimacy to
projects and efforts of reconciliation that are not built
around the discourse of individual responsibility, judi-
cially established truth and penal sanctions, which, in all
likelihood, no amount of expanding mechanisms of vic-
tim involvement82 will cure. This is so because ICL is
77. For one aspect of food prices and its effects due to ethanol subsidies see
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18858444> (last visited 4 September
2012).
78. D. Terris et al., The International Judge: an Introduction to the Men
and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases (2007) at 160-164.
79. Koskenniemi (2011), supra n. 8 at 171-197.
80. D. Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International
Humanitarianism (2004).
81. Ibid. at 10 speaking about the humanitarian and human rights move-
ment in general, of which international criminal law is a part.
82. For a short overview of the victim participation model currently in exist-
ence see M. Findlay, ‘Activating a Victim Constituency in International
Criminal Justice’, 3 International Journal of Transitional Justice, at 183
(2009).
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tied down to values and conceptions where the centre
stage is either the contest between the prosecutor and
the defendant with an umpire in between and/or a pro-
cess of establishing a legally verifiable truth and out-
come – guilty or not guilty. It will remain a judicial pro-
cess for establishing a judicial or judicially verifiable
truth for if it were to allow for any other kind of estab-
lishment of truth, of the truth narrative of the victims or
of the truth narrative of the defendant, it would not be a
liberal criminal process but a show trial.83 By this, I do
not mean to say that it is a process where no truth is
established, but that the truth that is being established is
the truth expressed in legal terms, where rape is
the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagi-
na or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetra-
tor or any other object used by the perpetrator; or
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the per-
petrator; where such sexual penetration occurs with-
out the consent of the victim.84
It is certainly not the single most humiliating event in
the victim’s life, but a penetration of a sexual nature,
one of many that has been perpetrated as part of a gov-
ernment or group policy or plan of which the person in
the dock was either a cog, a crank shaft or not involved.
It allows for no other conclusion. As all narratives, it
privileges some, neglects others and suppresses others
still. It is, in short, hegemonic. It “always consolidates
some hegemonic narrative, some understanding of the
political conflict which is a part of the conflict itself.”85
Moreover, to “focus on individual guilt instead of, say,
economic, political or military structures, is to leave
invisible, and thus to underwrite the story those struc-
tures have produced by pointing at a scapegoat.”86
Finally, ICL “is a weak and vulnerable strategy to cope
with large crises: the more we insist on its technical
character, the more we look away from its role in
strengthening one narrative over others, and the more
the trial will ratify the hegemony of that power on
whose shoulders justice sits.”87 Aside some words that I
would not use in the last few sentences, scapegoat being
one of them, I agree with Koskenniemi’s analysis – in
the Gramscian and Laclaunian themes of hegemony,
ICL is hegemonic, and it is hegemonic because it has
been successful in capturing the structure of the dis-
course through which legal and political claims are
being made to address a factual situation, a mass atroci-
ty. In the next section, I will attempt to unpack this
notion of hegemony and demonstrate its normality and,
therefore its futility as a critical concept.
83. Koskenniemi (2011), supra n. 8 at 171-197.
84. Kunarac Trial Chamber judgment, para. 460.
85. Koskenniemi (2011), supra n. 8 at 234.
86. Ibid., at 235.
87. Ibid. at 235.
4. Inescapable Hegemony and
Post-National Narratives
To understand the current meaning of the word
‘hegemony’ or ‘hegemonic’, we need to go back to the
assumptions under which this notion of hegemony
works. This notion of hegemony works within the world
view of anti-formalism or anti-foundationalism, a world
view that challenges ‘foundationalis’ thought, i.e.
thought based on a conception of Truth (with a capital
T) that mirrors the world88 and offers and independent
check on our actions, notions, words and deeds.89 It
claims that we can know the world unmitigated and
independent of our beliefs, based on unbiased evidence
and through a scientific method of inquiry.90 Anti-foun-
dationalism broadly claims that there is no conception of
the world that is not already tainted by the particular
biases of the local and the historical and that all current
discourses are projected within a certain, local, historical
structure of belief about what the world is and how it
works. In anti-foundationalist thought, universalism is a
non-starter; it does not exist independently of a histori-
cally placed discourse and if it is achieved, and I stress
the word achieved, it is achieved only for a moment in a
specific historical and cultural period and, consequently,
not at all universal, at least not in the terms that founda-
tionalists’ claim. There is no capital T truth, but truth
understood and seen as truth only within the particular
sets of beliefs, world views, paradigms, narratives.91 In
this sense, all narratives are local; they stand as the
opposite to Truth: since where there is no capital T
truth, there is only a narrative, and more specifically,
someone’s narrative. And this is where we come to
hegemony, for hegemony is presented, in its purely
descriptive (formal as opposite to substantive) form as a
point of view that presents itself as representing a uni-
versal point of view and, if successful in its presentation,
privileges one set of values and side-lines, suppresses,
neglects, has a blind spot to other points of view, other
value systems, other cultures and histories, in short,
other narratives. It is hegemonic because it succeeds in
marshalling the power of a legal and political system for
its own agenda. In Koskenniemi’s words:
In political terms, this is visible in the fact that there
is no representative of the whole that would not be
simultaneously a representative of some particular.
‘Universal values’ or ‘the international community’
can only make themselves known through mediation
by a state, an organisation or political movement.
Likewise, behind every notion of universal interna-
88. For instance see R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979);
R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991).
89. Also see the opening chapter in S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally:
Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal
Studies (1989).
90. Koskenniemi (2011), supra n. 8 at 296-299.
91. B.Z. Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and a Social
Theory of Law (1997).
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tional law there is always some particular view,
expressed by a particular actor in some particular sit-
uation. This is why it is pointless to ask about the
contribution of international law to the global com-
munity without clarifying first what or whose view of
international law is meant. However universal the
terms in which international law is invoked, it never
appears as an autonomous and stable set of demands
over a political reality. Instead it always appears
through the position of political actors, as a way of
dressing political claims in a specialised technical idi-
om in the conditions of hegemonic contestation.
(emphasis in the original)92
As I noted previously, ICL certainly fits the bill; it is a
specific liberal response to atrocities, and as such espe-
cially combined with a human rights mindset, de-legiti-
mises governments and movements (amnesties and
forgiveness for example) that do not comport with the
value and belief system that it espouses. The same can
be said about constitutionalisation and especially about
constitutionalism, for it too sees the world and pro-
scribes for it institutions and measures of legitimacy that
have a particular liberal value set. Constitituionalism
and its particular public law and public authority itera-
tion puts individuals at the centre with public law
presenting a limitation on public authorities in order to
preserve a very liberal idea of individual rights and indi-
vidual autonomy. It does this under the belief that indi-
vidual rights and the protected individual autonomy
that they bring about is a universal good, respected and
cherished across the world oblivious to the fact that, at
least for the moment, all of the ‘consumers’ of the Rome
Statute are part of a regional system that has in the title
of its preeminent human rights convention the word
Peoples’ rights, rights of groups and communities with
and without states and not just as nations.93
However, calling it hegemonic does nothing to add to
the critical project for, under these starting assump-
tions, any narrative that succeeds it will be no more and
no less hegemonic just differently so. It will be hegem-
onic because in a world view of no universals, of com-
peting narratives, of as the Gershwin song goes “I say
tomato you say tomato”94 there will always be different
narratives vying for the privileged position of being the
dominant discourse, the master-narrative. Sticking to
this formal view of hegemony leaves us with no critical
foothold, for as any formal, abstract description, it
either does not exist since it will already be tainted with
background structures of belief and values (and there-
fore not formal at all but substantive) or if it remains
formal it will not be able to resist any imposition of con-
92. Koskenniemi (2011), supra n. 8 at 221-222.
93. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Concluded at Nairobi
on 27 June 1981 and especially seeThe Social and Economic Rights
Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Niger-
ia, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm.
No. 155/96 (2001).
94. See more in S. Fish, The Trouble With Principle (1999) and especially
at 19-33.
tent (since the emptiness of substance is its claim, it is
merely descriptive) and can and will be marshalled in
any political project. It either cannot exist because for its
existence to be possible it needs a structure of belief, a
world view through which the words can project their
meaning (hegemony = bad, evil, oppressive). And if it
does exist in its purely formal realm, then it cannot
resist any imposition of substance for even the most, to
us, abhorrent regimes, the Taliban, the North Korean
dynasty, the Spanish inquisition, the Neo Nazis, can use
it to claim that the narratives that oppose it, and oppose
it for good reasons, are blind to their world view, to
their values, to their narratives and that the measures
used to suppress such narratives are in themselves
hegemonic for they will speak from a partial, partisan
position that has pretences to impose its value system on
the world views that it sees as abhorrent.
But, of course, that is not what the narratives now in
contention over the international political system claim,
for at the centre of each claim is the hope that if their
description/construction of the world is accepted every-
body will be able to go about their own business and no
one’s world view will be sidelined. At least that is the
hope that comes with projects such as pluralism and
fragmentation for what they hope is that through a plu-
ralist or fragmented world, space will be created for all
narratives to flourish.
Let us take for example a recent defence of pluralism as
a way to organise the world order, Niko Krisch’s Beyond
Constitutionalism.95 In his book, Krisch argues for a plu-
ralist post-national world order where the world is
organised in a blurred separation of layers of normative
orders that are not organised by a single overreaching
set of norms like a constitution.96 Nevertheless, these
divergent normative orders that have differing sources
of authority are still entwined in a post-national world
order that has at its core the protection of individual
public autonomy which provides ‘an anchor’97 to this
world order. As such, a narrative that offers a ‘break’98
from the current international law master-narrative, it
still cannot distance itself from the very liberal notion of
the protection of individual and, albeit public, autono-
my. It is not surprising, for what Krisch’s pluralism
entails is world order that is populated with much the
same actors as before – states, international organisa-
tions, regimes – just that now rather than promoting a
framework tied down to general international law as a
possible world constitution it provides a framework that
ties its actors to a floating substantive notion, floating
since it is not specifically mentioned in any international
source of authority but rather is part and parcel of the
assumptions of what human and constitutional rights
are all about. It is the slightly more European or Ger-
man version of the humanisation of international law or
95. Krisch (2010), supra n. 2.
96. Ibid., at 69-78.
97. Ibid., at 70.
98. Ibid., at 14-26.
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the pro homine approach that other scholars99 and judg-
es100 promote, but Kirsch’s approach shares with these
approaches the same basic assumption: that a world
order is or should be underpinned by and safeguard the
very Enlightenment achievement of thinking of human
beings as rational individuals with their own bubble of
autonomy where freedom, free will and so on can exist.
Do not get me wrong; it is not the notion of individual
autonomy or its different iterations that I criticise in this
article, but the notion that we can have a world order or
any organising narrative that does not privilege some
and exclude others from the legitimate, rational (rational
within a specific world view and hence irrational to oth-
ers) decision-making processes. In the purely formal,
descriptive realm of Gramscian hegemony, any narra-
tive – even the one presenting itself as a counter-narra-
tive – will be hegemonic, i.e. it will be hegemonic if
successful and until that time it will be a hegemonic nar-
rative in waiting.
But surely some would say that a purely descriptive nar-
rative would escape the offence of being hegemonic. For
instance, if we were to keep to a descriptive narrative of
the way that the current world structure is – to say that
the world is fragmented into many different regimes and
states, that those entities follow different sources of
authority and have differing views on the proper align-
ment of world order and that they inevitably either clash
or support each other or a combination of the above.
Certainly a narrative of this nature holding itself in the
purely descriptive (for now let me acknowledge that that
is a possibility) form will be completely useless, beyond
the realm of point scoring (now they clash now they
support each other) and will have nothing useful to say
on how to manage the inevitable encounters that ensue.
The moment that a narrative ventures outside of its
descriptive realm and tries to asses certain conditions,
events and structures as good or bad, it loses its descrip-
tiveness since something can only become ‘good’, ‘wor-
thy’, etc. through the lens of a specific world view, a
specific narrative.
Consequently, even though the philosophy of ‘I say
tomato, you say tomato’ is true we cannot call the whole
thing off. We are stuck on this piece of rock and are
forced to deal with each other and unless a divine, uni-
versal perspective becomes available to us, a point of
view from everywhere and nowhere in particular then
we are forced in managing through the world in a par-
ticular, historical and local point of view, our communi-
ty’s narrative. So long as we are in such an epistemologi-
cal condition, we have no choice but to order the world,
see things as right or wrong from a local and historical
point of view. Furthermore, when this view at its core
clashes with a differently but equally important core of
another point of view, another narrative, we will have
the choice of either using all the tricks up our sleeves to
99. For instance see T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law
(2006).
100. See for instance the various judgments by Judge Antônio Augusto Can-
çado Trindade in both the IACtHR and the ICJ.
counter the other narrative or be persuaded by it
(although choice is not really the right word at this point
for we can hardly have a choice in what we believe for
persuasion comes through a messy winding route) and
adopt its view.101
5. Conclusion
International Criminal Law and its different regime
iterations certainly do have a significant number of con-
stitutional features, from its public law foundations,
separation of powers features, its rule of law commit-
ment, to its human rights mindset. It is a particular nar-
rative that comes with its own assumptions about
rational individuals with individual autonomy and as
such it is open to some and blind to other ways of deal-
ing with atrocities or with other international regimes or
states. Moreover it has managed to capture a significant
part of the discourse of the international community so
much so that conflicts and conflict resolution is struc-
tured around topics such as jurisdiction, plan and poli-
cy, attack, civilian population, combatant, proportional,
reprisals, impunity, defendant, mens rea, actus reus, etc.
As such, it does not admit topics such as forgiveness,
reconciliation, restoration, community acceptance and
community responsibility. It offers a specific and nar-
row response to set of events and it does so while behol-
den to a specific set of values, and, as such, is hegemon-
ic.
However, it is this charge of hegemony that lacks coher-
ence, at least in its purely descriptive form. It does not
help in the critical project for it does not alert its reader
to values, problems, blind spots that a specific narrative
has. It merely says that the current narrative is the dom-
inant one – the master-narrative – but it is incapable of
critiquing it in any coherent way. For instance, here is
Koskenniemi on the current international public law
hegemony:
Such a perspective too readily adopts the standpoint
of the hegemon … a great power with a political and
legal agenda to impose on the world. Looked from
other points of view, however, the main problems of
world order are not those the hegemon is obsessed
with – use of force and national security – but eco-
nomic problems, poverty being the most striking
example, i.e. problems the hegemon usually casts as
outside regulation by public international law. Yet it
is important to see that as massive Third World pov-
erty is sustained by the dealings of unrepresentative
Third World governments with private transnational
corporations, it is not unrelated to the international
legal system that provides those governments with
the competence to borrow funds from the interna-
tional financial markets and to conclude concession
agreements with Western companies against the
101. See more in Fish (1997), supra n. 8 at 378-385; Fish (1999), supra
n. 94.
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interests of their country and populations for decades
to come. In this regard, the global public order – its
principles of recognition of governments, binding
force and non-intervention – is fully implicated in
what can only be seen as a deeply unjust system of
distributing material and spiritual values.102 (footnote
omitted)
Koskenniemi and I are in full agreement regarding the
current focus of public international law and its many
blind spots, but where we differ is in the futility of the
adjective hegemonic. And the reason for that is that
what does the critical work in this paragraph is not the
categorisation of the United States as a hegemon, but
the marshalling of evidence and issues to which the
United States and its specific neo-conservative world
view is blind to – by the invocation of the images of star-
vation, famines and poverty, facts on the ground that are
seen as a product of a ‘deeply unjust system of distribut-
ing material and spiritual values.’ And they can only be
seen as an unjust system by stepping out of that neo-
conservative world view and critiquing it from a differ-
ent one where the unjustness of it is plain for all see.
Moreover, if Koskenniemi’s critic were to succeed, the
international public law system would be changed and
would espouse different values than the ones it current-
ly holds and as such it would privilege some approaches,
such as debt relief, comprehensive labour standards,
wider regulation on companies, freezing of financial
markets to un-democratic illiberal regimes and be indif-
ferent to others, such as sovereign equality, national
security, free trade, etc., and it would think the privi-
leged ones as just and the un-privileged ones as unjust.
And the ones that do not share those values would
think, for instance, that in this new public international
law order, freedom has ceased to exist, that we are
increasing the role of governments too much and that
we are all on the ‘road to serfdom’103 and they would be
able to say, with good justification, that they are living
under a hegemonic world order that privileges alien
views and viewpoints while blind to their own. It is a
loop that keeps on going like a broken record.
It is in its current formal and descriptive form that
hegemony loses its coherence as a critical concept and if
we want it to have its critical bite, it has to be attached to
substantive values and say specifically what hegemony
entails, and why it is a bad thing. In a sense, it can only
be useful as a concept if it is substantive, filled with con-
tent and honest about it being open to some and closed
to other interests and values. Otherwise, as it currently
stands, it is a rhetorical tool, an insult hurled at one’s
debating opponent so as to put her on the defensive and
ill at ease. But a skilled debating opponent can easily
hurl the same insult back and prove that her debating
opponent will be no less of a hegemon were it to be in
her place. It seems that, in its retreat to a formal
descriptive, hegemony has managed to become our con-
102. Koskenniemi (2011), supra n. 8 at 238-239.
103. F.A. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944).
stant companion, one that we cannot get rid of, unless or
until we find that universal perspective or we change the
discourse.
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